Schadenfreude: a counternormative observer response to workplace mistreatment by Li, X et al.
 1 






Shanghai Jiao Tong University 
 
DANIEL J. MCALLISTER 
REMUS ILIES 
National University of Singapore 
 
JAMIE L. GLOOR 




We thank former associate editor Kris Byron and three anonymous reviewers for their extremely 




Although almost all employees have heard of or witnessed colleagues being mistreated, we have 
an incomplete understanding of how employees perceive and respond to such events. In previous 
research scholars established that observer emotions can be congruent with victim emotions, but 
we examine observer schadenfreude, an incongruent emotion that is also prevalent in 
organizations. Based on appraisal theories of emotion, we propose a process model of 
schadenfreude emergence and development: initial schadenfreude occurs when observers 
appraise mistreatment incidents as relevant and conducive to their goals; this initial feeling 
evolves into either righteous or ambivalent schadenfreude, depending on observers’ secondary 
appraisals of victim deservingness. We also address the implications of schadenfreude for 
observer behavior and the moderating effects of observers’ moral foundations and organizational 
civility climate. Our model extends current knowledge about observer reactions and helps us 
understand the persistence and pervasiveness of workplace mistreatment. 
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Modern organizations are interwoven systems of social interaction that can provide 
support and friendship when individuals are courteous and warm (Heaphy & Dutton, 2008), but 
they can also be sources of stress and conflict when individuals behave in hostile ways (e.g., 
incivility, abuse, undermining, and bullying). Research has documented the negative and 
potentially devastating consequences of workplace interpersonal mistreatment for victims (for a 
review, see Hershcovis, 2011). Because almost all employees hear of or witness incidents of 
workplace mistreatment (Olson-Buchanan & Boswell, 2008; Porath & Pearson, 2010), 
researchers have also broadened the scope of inquiry to address the perspective of and 
consequences for third-party observers (e.g., Mitchell, Vogel, & Folger, 2012, 2015; Skarlicki & 
Kulik, 2005). 
Scholars have shown that observers of interpersonal mistreatment can be like victims in 
that they also experience stress and injustice. From a stress perspective, observers may 
experience secondary trauma from empathetic pain and fear of their own victimization (e.g., 
Miner-Rubino & Cortina, 2007; Porath & Erez, 2009; Robinson, Wang, & Kiewitz, 2014). From 
the perspective of deontic justice (Folger, 2001), observers regard mistreatment as unjust and 
respond with perpetrator-directed anger and sympathy for victims (e.g., O’Reilly & Aquino, 
2011; O’Reilly, Aquino, & Skarlicki, 2016; Reich & Hershcovis, 2015; Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010). 
With mindful reflection, even observers who fail to fully grasp incidents of mistreatment at the 
outset may come to feel empathic concern for victims (Atkins & Parker, 2012). Thus, existing 
theoretical models bring observer and victim responses into alignment. 
However, the workplace dynamics of competition, envy, and intergroup tensions that 
motivate interpersonal mistreatment (Kim & Glomb, 2014; Lam, Van der Vegt, Walter, & 
Huang, 2011; Venkatramani & Dalal, 2007) also imply that observer and victim perspectives 
may diverge. In truth, observers are not always moved by the plight of mistreated victims, and 
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they often withhold assistance (Mitchell et al., 2015). Indeed, the frequency with which 
mistreatment is delivered in a collective manner (e.g., gossip, ostracism, and mobbing) suggests 
that observers often favor perpetrators over victims. Such dynamics are all too prevalent and 
contradict current models of observers. 
It follows that an exclusive focus on observer emotions that are congruent with victim 
emotions avoids the painful truth that observers may experience a prototypically incongruent 
social emotion—schadenfreude, or pleasure derived from another’s misfortune (Blader, 
Wiesenfeld, Rothman, & Wheeler-Smith, 2010). We ground our conceptual understanding of 
observer emotions in appraisal theory, which explains people’s emotional reactions in terms of 
their cognitive appraisals of events (e.g., Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Scherer, 1984, 2001). Scholars 
have used appraisal theory to explain observer emotions, such as perpetrator-directed anger 
(O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011) and victim-directed compassion (Atkins & Parker, 2012). We draw 
on this foundation to provide a complementary perspective on the psychological processes that 
govern schadenfreude. 
Based on appraisal theories of emotion (Lazarus, 1991), we propose that observers may 
react quickly with schadenfreude when their primary appraisal indicates that a situation of 
interpersonal mistreatment is relevant and conducive to their goal attainment. After 
schadenfreude’s emergence, observers’ secondary appraisals of victim deservingness may alter 
the nature and intensity of this preliminary positive emotion. That is, secondary appraisals of 
mistreatment as deserved give rise to righteous schadenfreude, and secondary appraisals of 
mistreatment as undeserved give rise to ambivalent schadenfreude. As these evaluations and 
emotional experiences differ, so do their behavioral consequences. 
In sum, we propose an emotion-based process model (see Figure 1) that depicts the 
appraisal processes underlying the emergence and development of observer schadenfreude, as 
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well as the subsequent behavioral consequences. By considering this counternormative feeling 
and addressing the combined roles of personal stakes and deservingness concerns, we advance 
current understanding of observer reactions to workplace mistreatment beyond the insights that 
stress and deontic justice theories afford. Furthermore, by showing the antisocial behavioral 
consequences of schadenfreude, we help explain how workplace mistreatment can persist and 
even become contagious. In the following sections we define schadenfreude and detail its 
underlying appraisal processes, behavioral reactions, and boundary conditions. We conclude 
with theoretical and practical implications, as well as directions for future research. 
CONCEPTUALIZING SCHADENFREUDE 
“Schadenfreude” comprises two lexical parts: schaden, meaning harm, and freude, 
meaning pleasure. This German word indicates counternormative and malicious joy. From 
antiquity, moral philosophers’ perspectives on schadenfreude have varied. For example, Aristotle 
(1992/367–322 B.C.E.) saw it as a disguised expression of aggression, and Schopenhauer 
(1998/1840) asserted that schadenfreude is diabolical. However, Ben-Ze’ev (2001) argued that 
schadenfreude is neither a virtue nor a vice. To avoid demonizing this natural emotion, we define 
schadenfreude as “pleasure at the misfortunes of others,” independent of whether it appears to be 
morally acceptable (van Dijk & Ouwerkerk, 2014a: 6). 
Schadenfreude reflects a passive, indirect, and opportunistic reaction to others’ 
misfortunes (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). It is distinct from gloating, a 
potential downstream consequence of schadenfreude in which witnesses gain pleasure from 
causing further adversity to the defeated (e.g., rubbing it in; Leach, Spears, & Manstead, 2015). 
Schadenfreude also differs from pride in achievement, joy triggered by pleasurable stimuli, and 
relief at a threat’s removal (Lazarus, 1991; Leach et al., 2015). 
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Schadenfreude is a social emotion that reflects an incongruent emotional orientation with 
the target (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). Social emotions can range on a spectrum, from perceiver-
target congruence (e.g., sympathy and vicarious joy) to perceiver-target incongruence (e.g., 
contempt and envy; Blader et al., 2010). Schadenfreude belongs to the latter category, because 
the joy stems from the target’s sadness, discomfort, or pain. 
Research on schadenfreude has gained traction in social psychology (Smith, 2013; van 
Dijk & Ouwerkerk, 2014a), but researchers have largely overlooked the workplace as a context 
for schadenfreude, with the notable exception of Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, and Hambrick (2008), 
who studied interorganizational schadenfreude. Thus, we extend the schadenfreude literature by 
theorizing about the emergence, development, and consequences of schadenfreude triggered by 
interpersonal adversity at work. 
AN EMOTION-BASED PROCESS MODEL OF SCHADENFREUDE 
Appraisal theories of emotion indicate that subjective appraisals of events influence 
emotional reactions (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & 
Frijda, 2013; Scherer, 1984, 2001). In life, our emotions are shaped by where we focus our 
attention, how we interpret and ascribe meaning to events, and what action implications we see. 
From this perspective, primary appraisals concerning the significance of events—whether they 
are relevant and conducive to a perceiver’s goals—provide the basis for swift emotional response 
(Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Moors et al., 2013). However, there is also an emergent quality of 
emotions, since initial emotional states are informed by subsequent appraisals, including 
appraisals of deservingness and the legitimacy of triggering events (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 
2001).  
Building on this understanding, we address experienced schadenfreude as an unfolding 
emotional episode that includes awareness of a triggering event, cognitive appraisals, subjective 
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feelings felt initially and over time, and action tendencies (Elfenbein, 2007; Moors et al., 2013). 
We posit that initial schadenfreude is the product of primary appraisal, whereby observers see 
colleagues’ mistreatment as being relevant and conducive to their goals. Initial schadenfreude 
then provides the impetus for a secondary appraisal of victim deservingness, the product of 
which is emergent schadenfreude, an updated emotional state with nuanced nature and intensity, 
which has implications for observer actions. 
Primary Appraisal (Ego Involvement) and Initial Schadenfreude 
Work environments are complex, and employees cannot be aware of or fully attend to all 
that happens around them. To cope with this complexity, they focus on people and events that 
are most relevant to their goals. Lazarus’s (1991) concept of ego involvement captures 
perceivers’ goal-related concerns—concerns for self-esteem and social esteem, aspirations 
(ideals), moral values, and the welfare of close others—that direct attention and prime appraisals. 
Beyond goal relevance, employees are concerned with goal conduciveness—namely, whether 
circumstances facilitate their goal attainment. 
Appraisal theorists acknowledge the apparent automaticity of primary appraisals of goal 
relevance and conduciveness (e.g., Lazarus, 1991). Evaluations become automatic as people 
learn to associate stimuli with outcomes (Carlston, 2010). People focus their attention on actors 
and events that matter most to their ego involvement, and their learning through life experience 
is encoded in refined mental schemas that support swift responding. In response to witnessed 
workplace mistreatment, observers tend to feel congruent emotions, such as empathy and 
compassion, when their goals are aligned with victims’ goals. However, when the goals of 
observers and victims are incompatible and observers gain at victims’ expense, observers can 
experience incongruent emotions such as schadenfreude (Elfenbein, 2014). 
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Structural, relational, and social factors shape employees’ ego involvement in 
organizational settings. Specifically, work arrangements, job requirements, and incentive 
structures couple ego concerns with work outcomes, and zero-sum or adversarial arrangements 
can generate competition and conflict (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014; Samnani & 
Singh, 2014). Furthermore, social comparisons regarding work inputs and/or rewards produce 
envy (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007). Finally, ingroup loyalty is crucial for group 
preservation, but social identity can spawn partiality of ingroup members and mistreatment of 
outgroup members. Thus, we propose that competition, envy, and intergroup bias create a 
tension that is likely to generate initial schadenfreude in response to observed victimization. 
Competition. Work designs, job descriptions, and performance incentives are powerful 
mechanisms that direct employees’ attention and channel their behavior (Baker, Jensen & 
Murphy, 1988; Kerr, 1975). Systems that align ego involvement (e.g., feelings of self-worth, 
fulfillment of aspirations, and feelings of responsibility) with constructive job performance 
function best. However, zero-sum performance incentives and tournament career progression 
models, where one party gains at others’ expense, create conditions for negative competition in 
which employees can succeed by sabotaging others (Connelly et al., 2014; Samnani & Singh, 
2014). 
Employees tend to focus on the actions and outcomes of competitors because of their 
implications for well-being (Labianca & Brass, 2006). When employees observe mistreatment of 
competitors, they may positively appraise such incidents and experience a surge of pleasant 
emotion in light of their potential personal benefits. For example, if two employees are 
competing for a promotion and one experiences supervisory abuse, the other may perceive the 
abuse as a sign of the leader’s hostility and dislike, thus believing that they have a higher chance 
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to win the promotion. More generally, the setbacks of perceived competitors provide employees 
with opportunities for gain and, thus, afford a basis for joy. 
Proposition 1a: Observers who perceive the targets of interpersonal mistreatment as 
competitors are more likely to appraise the mistreatment as relevant and conducive to 
their goals and, thus, feel initial schadenfreude. 
Envy. Modern theories of social comparison and envy indicate that employees constantly 
compare themselves with coworkers in terms of the quality of their achievements, possessions, 
and the treatment they receive from the organization (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Cohen-Charash 
& Mueller, 2007). Envy is social pain that arises “when a person lacks another’s superior quality, 
achievement, or possession and either desires it or wishes that the other lacked it” (Parrott & 
Smith, 1993: 908; see also Tai, Narayanan, & McAllister, 2012).  
We posit that envious employees will appraise mistreatment of envied parties as relevant 
and conducive to their goals. Envy includes feelings of inferiority and hostility, which focus 
increased attention on the activities of envied targets and motivate enviers to damage the targets 
(Crusius & Lange, 2014; van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). When envied targets are 
mistreated, observers find satisfaction in knowing that upward social comparisons are leveled. 
More fundamentally, observed mistreatment serves as imaginary revenge against the targets’ 
superiority (Nietzsche, 1967/1887). Thereby, observers have increased self-esteem and feel 
schadenfreude (van Dijk & Ouwerkerk, 2014b). 
Proposition 1b: Observers who envy the targets of interpersonal mistreatment are more 
likely to appraise the mistreatment as relevant and conducive to their goals and, thus, 
feel initial schadenfreude. 
Intergroup bias. Employees’ ego involvement within group or organizational settings 
partly depends on the importance they ascribe to social group membership (Brewer & Caporael, 
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2006). People tend to automatically classify themselves and others into social groups based on 
certain traits (e.g., occupation, gender, and ethnicity) and imbue these groups with meaning 
(Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Group membership has adaptive benefits because people 
extend depersonalized trust to all ingroup members owing to their shared qualities, beliefs, 
expectations about the group’s purpose and knowledge of what membership means (Brewer, 
2008). Thus, people tend to value their group memberships, view their groups’ success as their 
own, and form their social identities around the prototypical qualities of the groups. However, 
such group identification can result in intergroup bias—namely, the tendency to favor ingroup 
members over outgroup representatives (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). 
The implications of social identities for initial schadenfreude are clear. First, if a fellow 
group member is mistreated, the observer’s sense of self-worth will be threatened and initial 
schadenfreude is less likely to occur. Second, when a victim is from a rival group that represents 
a threat to ingroup values, schadenfreude is more likely to occur (Smith, Powell, Combs, & 
Schurtz, 2009). Third, although ingroup favoritism may not bring about overt outgroup-directed 
hostility, it can still manifest in more subtle forms of discrimination—through reserving 
admiration, sympathy, and trust for ingroup members (Brewer, 1999). Thus, when group 
boundaries are salient and a group’s status or power is threatened, established loyalty can rouse 
sufficient outgroup-directed negativity for schadenfreude to occur when an outgroup member is 
mistreated (Leach & Spears, 2008; Leach et al., 2015; Leach et al., 2003). 
Proposition 1c: Observers who have high ingroup loyalty and perceive the targets of 
interpersonal mistreatment as outgroup members are more likely to appraise the 
mistreatment as relevant and conducive to their goals and, thus, feel initial 
schadenfreude. 
Secondary Appraisal of Deservingness and Emergent Schadenfreude 
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Acts of mistreatment violate established social norms that call for caring and respectful 
treatment. Thus, further reflection on the legitimacy of mistreatment conditions schadenfreude’s 
nature (Kuipers, 2014; Spears & Leach, 2004). That is, beyond the primary appraisal associated 
with self-interested goal facilitation that induces initial schadenfreude, observers secondarily 
appraise whether victims bear some responsibility for and therefore deserve the treatment they 
received (Feather, 1999; Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; Lazarus, 1991). Observers can accomplish 
secondary appraisal through implicit or explicit means (Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002; Feather, 1999). 
Implicit processing. In implicit information processing, cognitive heuristics or shortcuts 
leverage experience and social learning to expedite judgments (Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002). As 
with primary appraisals, implicit processing tends to be automatic, with little or no cognitive 
elaboration. Implicit processing is inherently biased toward confirming existing beliefs and 
reaching specific conclusions, often resulting in the underestimation of situational influences 
(Barclay, Bashshur, & Fortin, 2017; Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002). In line with this, we propose that 
belief in a just world and identification with perpetrators drive observers to implicitly blame 
victims because of the activation of justice and relational concerns (respectively). 
Belief in a just world. In past research scholars established that individuals who believe 
that people get what they deserve are more inclined to attribute others’ outcomes to internal 
reasons (Lerner, 1980). Those who believe in a just world have a sense of order and security 
about life and fairness and therefore become anxious when innocent parties are mistreated 
because it challenges their beliefs about reality. If they can assume that the victims themselves 
are responsible for their pain, they are reassured that the world is just (Lerner, 1980). Thus, to 
reduce aversive feelings resulting from injustice, they may rationalize mistreatment by 
derogating victims and affirming that victims deserved their pain, even when evidence of victim 
responsibility is lacking (Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002; Lerner, 1980; Skarlicki & Turner, 2014). 
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Proposition 2a: Observers who hold stronger beliefs in a just world are more inclined to 
blame victims and appraise the mistreatment as deserved. 
Identification with the perpetrator. To maintain and enhance feelings of self-worth or 
social esteem, employees are motivated to become legitimate and respected social group 
members (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Because of intergroup biases, people tend to favor ingroup 
members in ambiguous situations (Brewer, 1999). Moreover, to avoid threatening their social 
identities, they will make external attributions for acts of injustice committed by ingroup 
members (Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002). Therefore, after an instance of 
mistreatment, they are likely to support an ingroup perpetrator and attribute responsibility to the 
victim, thus perceiving the victim as deserving of harm. Indeed, layoff survivors who have 
higher organizational identification tend to assign blame to those who lost their jobs rather than 
to the organization (Brockner & Greenberg, 1990). 
Proposition 2b: Observers who have stronger identification with the perpetrator are 
more inclined to blame victims and appraise the mistreatment as deserved. 
Explicit processing. Through explicit processing, observers investigate causes of 
interpersonal mistreatment and assign blame in a rational, effortful, and controlled mode (Ellard 
& Skarlicki, 2002). Specifically, observers weigh victims’ behavior in light of the mistreatment 
received, and their judgments of responsibility are less affected by the desire to reach a specific 
conclusion (Barclay et al., 2017; Feather, 1999). For example, they will ascribe justice to 
positive outcomes following positive actions or negative outcomes following negative actions. 
Thus, witnesses who know of a victim’s past misbehavior may appraise mistreatment as 
deserved. When firsthand information about a victim’s character or past deeds is lacking, they 
may draw on others’ perspective or knowledge (Barclay et al., 2017). 
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Victim misconduct. Observers may explicitly and rationally link the mistreatment of a 
victim with the victim’s past misdeeds, such as poor work performance, absenteeism, or deviant 
behavior (Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002). When this occurs, observers may regard mistreatment as 
appropriate punishment that restores conditions of justice (Felson, 2004; Trevino, 1992) and, 
thus, appraise it as deserved. 
However, observers will also incorporate information on intentionality and controllability 
of victim misconduct—whether victims intended to act badly and could have controlled the 
conditions preceding their misbehavior—into their appraisals of responsibility (Trevino, 1992). 
Perceivers consider intentional misconduct more severe because it breaks the social order and 
may recur (Miller & Vidmar, 1981). When misconduct appears intentional and controllable, 
observers are more likely to assign responsibility to the actor and appraise punishment as 
deserved (Trevino, 1992). For example, peers tend to reject low performers who are capable but 
lack motivation (Jackson & LePine, 2003). In this case observers may perceive that low 
performers deserve such rejection. Conversely, if misconduct is deemed to be unintentional or 
beyond personal control, observers are less likely to support punishment because they view the 
misconduct as arising from situational constraints rather than disregard of norms (Utne & Kidd, 
1980). 
Proposition 2c: Observers who know of victim misconduct, especially intentional and 
controllable misconduct, are more likely to blame victims and appraise the mistreatment 
as deserved. 
Other observers’ appraisals. Observers often lack detailed background information and 
must rely on others’ accounts, such as when they learn about incidents of mistreatment through 
the grapevine (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). Social information processing theory explains that cues 
from the immediate social environment affect beliefs (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Thus, as 
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observers exchange information about events and discuss the reputations of involved parties, 
they provide one another with contextual cues for interpreting events and attributing 
responsibility (Latane & Darley, 1970; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). Ultimately, their judgments are 
based on a socially constructed reality (DeGoey, 2000). 
Deservingness judgments can be contagious because information seeking and sharing 
may be mutually validating and reinforcing (Darley & Latane, 1968; Lamertz, 2002; Lind, Kray, 
& Thompson, 1998; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). Thus, we propose that responsibility attributions 
are susceptible to social influences and victim responsibility attributions may largely reflect the 
views of others. 
Proposition 2d: Observers are more inclined to blame victims and appraise the 
mistreatment as deserved when other observers also blame victims. 
Emergent schadenfreude: Righteous or ambivalent. Appraisal theorists maintain that 
later appraisals calibrate earlier feelings (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1984, 2001). In our dynamic 
process model, deservingness appraisal adjusts initial schadenfreude. Specifically, when 
observers appraise mistreatment as deserved, their schadenfreude is intensified because 
restoration of justice induces pleasure (Feather, 2014). Indeed, neuroscience indicates that the 
brain’s reward circuits are activated when individuals witness deserved punishment (de Quervain 
et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006). In addition, deserved mistreatment justifies schadenfreude, 
allowing observers to believe that their pleasure transcends self-interest. Thus, when observers 
deem mistreatment deserved, initial schadenfreude becomes stronger and takes on a moral 
quality as righteous schadenfreude (Kuipers, 2014). 
However, when observers find that victims are innocent or that mistreatment is 
disproportionate to victims’ wrongdoing, they may question the morality of their pleasure 
(Spears & Leach, 2004). Thus, initial schadenfreude is tempered by legitimacy concerns, and 
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observers may feel emotions of self-reproach, such as embarrassment, guilt, and shame, for 
failing to live up to moral ideals and for valuing self-interests over morality. Therefore, when 
observers perceive mistreatment as somewhat undeserved, malicious joy lacks social legitimacy 
and initial schadenfreude manifests as ambivalent schadenfreude. 
Proposition 3a: When observers appraise victim mistreatment as deserved, initial 
schadenfreude gives rise to righteous schadenfreude. 
Proposition 3b: When observers appraise victim mistreatment as undeserved, initial 
schadenfreude gives rise to ambivalent schadenfreude. 
Observers’ Behavioral Reactions to Schadenfreude 
Having discussed the appraisal process underlying the emergence and development of 
schadenfreude, and the factors shaping appraisals, we now address implications for behavior. 
Emotional states generate emotional expressions, with stronger emotions eliciting greater 
exuberance (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Elfenbein, 2007). However, people are careful in how they 
express counternormative emotions such as schadenfreude (Butler & Gross, 2004). More 
generally, social emotions influence how a perceiver “approaches, interacts, and engages with 
the target (i.e., helps, cooperates, antagonizes, or avoids)” (Blader et al., 2010: 33). We address 
the emotional displays of schadenfreude and the implications of schadenfreude for interpersonal 
behaviors such as active and passive mistreatment and avoidance. 
Emotional displays. Emotional display norms prescribe and regulate emotional 
expressions, and people comply with them by expressing socially appropriate emotions and not 
displaying inappropriate emotions (Butler & Gross, 2004). Although schadenfreude has a 
counternormative quality, we argue that perceivers expect stronger moral or social proscriptions 
against feeling and expressing ambivalent schadenfreude than against feeling and expressing 
righteous schadenfreude. This is because with appraisals that victims deserve mistreatment, 
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observers may justify their expressions of righteous pleasure as celebrating the restoration of 
justice instead of fulfilling personal interest, rendering this pleasure free of guilt. In contrast, 
feelings of guilt, shame, embarrassment, and an awareness of others’ moral disapproval may 
accompany the displays of ambivalent schadenfreude. Thus, observers may withhold their 
expressions of joy to contain aversive feelings and avoid damaging their social image. Taken 
together, we theorize that observers will express righteous schadenfreude and suppress the 
improper joy of ambivalent schadenfreude. 
Proposition 4: Observers who feel righteous (ambivalent) schadenfreude will express 
(suppress) the pleasure. 
Mistreatment. From a functionalist perspective, emotions emerge as a consequence of 
progress in goal pursuit and evoke action tendencies that facilitate goal attainment (Frijda, 1986, 
1988; Levenson, 1999). Within the sphere of social relations, schadenfreude differentiates and 
distances the self from others and prepares individuals for goal-directed actions that may entail 
further harm to victims (Fischer & Manstead, 2016). In support of this, the findings of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies associate schadenfreude with activation of the 
ventral striatum (Takahashi et al., 2009), an area of the brain responsible for learning stimulus-
reward associations and acquiring representations of predicted reward value (O’Doherty, 2004). 
Thus, for observers of interpersonal mistreatment, schadenfreude that surfaces knowledge of the 
linkage between mistreatment and personal gain may provide the impetus for further infliction of 
harm. However, whereas ambivalent schadenfreude elicits only passive mistreatment, righteous 
schadenfreude propels observers toward both active and passive mistreatment. The two forms of 
mistreatment differ in that active mistreatment involves agentic behaviors to harm the target 
through hostile treatment, such as negative social attention, rude comments, and interference 
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with work, whereas passive mistreatment entails acts of omission and disengagement, such as 
withholding help, support, and resources (Buss, 1961; Neuman & Baron, 2005). 
Active mistreatment. In the case of righteous schadenfreude, observers appraise the 
victim’s mistreatment as deserved and the perpetrator’s actions as justified. Especially when 
observed mistreatment is not commensurate with past misdeeds, justification of the perpetrator’s 
behavior provides license for others to also mistreat the victim. Under these conditions, 
observers may display active mistreatment through overt hostility, abuse, and undermining. 
The dynamics of social justification that lead to active mistreatment suggest potential for 
social contagion and collective action. That is, when observers appraise initial acts of 
mistreatment as appropriate and join in, a “bandwagon effect” occurs in which collective action 
facilitates new forms of mistreatment, including mobbing and gossip. We focus specifically on 
gossip—an indirect form of active mistreatment—as an example of collective action. 
Workplace gossip is “informal and evaluative talk in an organization, usually among no 
more than a few individuals, about another member of that organization who is not present” 
(Kurland & Pelled, 2000: 429). Negative gossip often discloses norm violations and damages 
reputations (Brady, Brown, & Liang, 2017). We associate righteous schadenfreude with negative 
gossip for two reasons. First, gossip may reinforce observers’ perceptions of goal attainment as 
they replay victims’ misfortunes and reaffirm victims’ inferiority (Fine & Rosnow, 1978; Suls, 
1977; Wert & Salovey, 2004). Ruminating and retelling the accounts may remind observers of 
the benefits from others’ pain, thus prolonging their pleasure. Second, when people regard 
mistreatment as deserved, gossiping is a way to spread the information that it is a just world 
where wrongdoers get punishment. In functionalist terms, gossip may reinforce collective values 
and deter future misconduct (Dasborough & Harvey, 2017). 
 18 
Proposition 5: Observers who feel righteous schadenfreude will further mistreat the 
target of this emotion through active means. 
Passive mistreatment. Passive mistreatment implies harm through inaction—for example, 
through withholding assistance and valuable information from victims (Buss, 1961; Neuman & 
Baron, 2005). Relative to active mistreatment, it seems mundane, innocuous, less detrimental, 
and more acceptable. However, it causes even greater psychological harm (O’Reilly, Robinson, 
Berdahl, & Banki, 2015). Because few organizations have policies or sanctions against passive 
mistreatment, such behavior can occur with impunity. Furthermore, inaction is difficult to 
discern and plausibly deniable (Jensen, Patel, & Raver, 2014). 
As the judgment that victims deserve mistreatment justifies further punishment, we 
predict that righteous schadenfreude provides impetus for not only active mistreatment but also 
passive mistreatment. In contrast, ambivalent schadenfreude will evoke fear of social 
repercussions from active mistreatment, so passive mistreatment is a functionally equivalent 
behavior that observers can perform with impunity. 
Proposition 6: Observers who feel righteous or ambivalent schadenfreude will further 
mistreat the target of this emotion through passive means. 
Avoidance. Since the joy in ambivalent schadenfreude results from others’ unjustified 
expense, observers may feel accompanied negative emotions such as guilt, shame, anxiety, and 
embarrassment. To reduce such aversive feelings and to save face, observers may choose to 
socially distance themselves from victims. Social avoidance is a form of emotion-based coping 
(Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010) in which observers avoid interaction with victims by working 
around them and finding alternative sources for information or resources that victims could 
provide (Nifadkar, Tsui, & Ashforth, 2012; Zapf & Gross, 2001). 
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Proposition 7: Observers who feel ambivalent schadenfreude will avoid the target of this 
emotion. 
Moral and Normative Regulation of Behavioral Responses 
Righteous schadenfreude and ambivalent schadenfreude generate action tendencies that 
have strong moral overtones. Drawing on moral foundations theory (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009) and the emerging scholarship on organizational climate (e.g., Clark & Walsh, 2016), we 
theorize that observers’ internally held moral standards and the normative expectations for 
workplace behavior may either constrain or intensify behavioral responses to schadenfreude 
(Jones, 1991; Trevino, 1986). 
Moral foundations. In recent research in the fields of management (Brown & Mitchell, 
2010; Weaver, Reynolds & Brown, 2014) and social psychology (Graham et al., 2009; Graham 
et al., 2011) scholars have identified two distinct sets of moral concern that govern moral 
behavior. One foundation is characterized by individualizing values that speak to the 
community’s duty to treat each person with care and fairness; the other foundation is group 
focused, characterized by the binding values of loyalty, purity, and respect for authority that hold 
communities together (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011). Our contention is that the 
extent to which observers subscribe to binding and individualizing values will moderate the 
effects of righteous or ambivalent schadenfreude on observer behavior. 
For observers who hold individualizing values, the moral imperative is to treat every 
person with care and fairness. Thus, these observers will consider it inappropriate to express 
schadenfreude and further mistreat or avoid a victim, irrespective of whether the mistreatment 
already meted out was deserved (Greenbaum, Mawritz, Mayer, & Priesemuth, 2013). Moreover, 
because concern for justice entails respect for due process (Silver & Silver, 2017) and a 
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preference for rehabilitating and restoring those who fall out of line (Brubacher, 2014), taking 
justice into one’s own hands through unilateral action is unacceptable for these observers. 
In practical terms, individualizing values raise the moral bar for behavior and, thus, 
dampen the associations of schadenfreude with emotional expression and antisocial behavior. In 
support of this, Mitchell and colleagues (2015) found that in response to supervisory 
mistreatment of a coworker, observer contentment was positively related to reported exclusion of 
the coworker, but only for observers who had low endorsement of values such as care, 
compassion, kindness, and fairness. 
Proposition 8: For observers with stronger individualizing values, (a) righteous 
schadenfreude will be less strongly associated with emotion expression, active 
mistreatment, and passive mistreatment, and (b) ambivalent schadenfreude will be more 
strongly associated with emotion suppression and less strongly associated with passive 
mistreatment and avoidance. 
For people who hold binding values, the duties of group loyalty, purity, and respect for 
authority are paramount (Graham et al., 2009). These people appreciate the security and tradition 
that group membership affords (McCusker, 2016). When strongly held binding values take 
priority over individualizing values, employees feel obligated to protect their groups and 
organizations and are more willing to harm individuals when it furthers collective interests 
(Hannah, Jennings, Bluhm, Peng & Schaubroeck, 2014; Teo & Chan-Serafin, 2013). 
Thus, whereas individualizing values prescribe consistency in treating people with justice 
and care, binding values suggest differential treatment to individuals, contingent on how they 
affect group interests (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Niemi & Young, 2016). In this 
regard, the context of righteous schadenfreude is particularly salient for observers with binding 
values. With the appraisal that victims deserve mistreatment, observers may judge victims 
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harshly since they already forfeited their rights as group members through prior misdeeds that 
may have harmed the group or brought dishonor or impurity to it. In this case observers who 
hold binding values may laud the perpetrator of mistreatment for responsible service to the group 
and may demonstrate the strength of their group loyalty not only through authentic expressions 
of joy but also by joining together with others in dispensing further mistreatment. 
Proposition 9: For observers with stronger binding values, righteous schadenfreude will 
be more strongly associated with emotion expression, active mistreatment, and passive 
mistreatment. 
Organizational civility climate. Through organizational socialization processes, 
employees internalize central organizational values regarding acceptable and prohibited 
behaviors (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Thus, we argue that organizational civility climate 
conditions observers’ behavioral reactions to schadenfreude. With strong civility climates, 
organizations prescribe courteous and respectful behavior, discourage social avoidance, prohibit 
mistreatment, and sanction perpetrators of mistreatment (Clark & Walsh, 2016). Therefore, 
observers are more likely to suppress their expressions of righteous and ambivalent 
schadenfreude and less likely to act on the schadenfreude-driven impulse to instigate 
mistreatment or show social avoidance.  
In contrast, organizations with weak civility climates lack the resolve and means to deter 
mistreatment and social disengagement. Sometimes such organizations even have norms that 
promote rather than constrain misbehavior. When observers in these organizations feel 
schadenfreude, they are less likely to self-regulate their behaviors or feel moral condemnation.  
Proposition 10: For observers in organizations with stronger civility climates, (a) 
righteous schadenfreude will be less strongly associated with emotion expression, active 
mistreatment, and passive mistreatment, and (b) ambivalent schadenfreude will be more 
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strongly associated with emotion suppression and less strongly associated with passive 
mistreatment and avoidance. 
DISCUSSION 
William James (1890) mused that humans have two souls: one sociable and helpful and 
the other jealous and antagonistic. Researchers have argued that observers of interpersonal 
mistreatment tend to be sociable souls who empathize with targets, but they have failed to 
consider the incongruent, counternormative emotions of the antagonistic soul. To better 
understand this understudied darker side, we focus on observer schadenfreude as a prototypical 
and prevalent response. Our work advances research by establishing the conditions under which 
schadenfreude emerges and is transformed into righteous or ambivalent schadenfreude, the 
behavioral implications of schadenfreude, and the moderating effects of moral foundations and 
normative pressures. Our conceptual approach allows us to explain and predict behaviors that 
established models of observer behavior do not account for, and it offers a practical perspective 
on the persistence of individual and collective forms of workplace interpersonal mistreatment. 
Implications for Theory 
Our conceptual framework has substantive implications for scholarship on observer 
reactions to interpersonal mistreatment. First, we call attention to schadenfreude—an  
unsympathetic observer emotion that is incongruent with victim emotions. According to 
principles of deontic justice, moral accountability should cause observers to feel compassion for 
victims and to take steps to help them (Atkins & Parker, 2012; O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011). 
Although we acknowledge the potential for empathic observer responding, we caution that 
exclusion of a broader set of self-interested responses would be untenable and oversimplify the 
reality of interpersonal relations in organizations. This is because work environments are 
contested terrain and employees are self-interested parties with legitimate goals for enhancement 
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of social esteem and self-esteem. We predict that for observers who are in competition with or 
envy victims, and for those who see victims as outgroup members, learning of a victim’s 
mistreatment will be a favorable stimulus that induces positive feelings. 
Second, through the lens of appraisal theory, we provide a rich new perspective on the 
episodic nature of observer schadenfreude. Within our model, observers experience initial 
schadenfreude as a surge of positive emotion because of personal gain from victims’ pain. This 
initial emotion has an automatic quality, because ego involvement primes attention to relevant 
circumstances and refined cognitive schemas allow observers to see the implications for personal 
benefit quickly. However, primary appraisal dynamics provide only the starting point for 
episodic schadenfreude, and feelings become nuanced as a result of the more deliberative 
secondary appraisal of responsibility and deservingness. That is, whereas schadenfreude takes on 
a righteous quality when observers appraise mistreatment as deserved, it takes on a more muted 
quality as an ambivalent emotion when observers view the mistreatment as unwarranted. 
Importantly, our work highlights the complex and dynamic nature of schadenfreude, and it points 
to the important role of observer attributions in the evolution of schadenfreude. Our perspective 
on the episodic quality of emotional experience is aligned with Kahneman’s (2011) explanation 
of the fast and slow systems that jointly guide judgment and decision-making. However, whereas 
Kahneman boiled down the essentials to thinking fast and slow, we speak of feeling fast and 
slow. 
Third, our work significantly broadens research on observers’ behavioral responses to 
interpersonal mistreatment by challenging normative expectations for observer behavior. In 
contrast to research indicating that observers are motivated to actively sanction perpetrators and 
support victims, we show that observers have the potential for further active or passive 
mistreatment. We also suggest that active mistreatment is a unique consequence of righteous 
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schadenfreude, because observers who feel righteous schadenfreude regard active mistreatment 
as a defensible means to restore justice, whereas those who feel ambivalent schadenfreude may 
have concerns about plausible deniability and choose passive mistreatment and avoidance as 
strategic means to avoid the associated self-reproach. 
Fourth, in modeling the antisocial behavioral consequences of schadenfreude, we see the 
potential for scholarship on observer reactions to address important issues that have 
 to date, confounded workplace mistreatment researchers. If acts of mistreatment rouse observer 
anger and injustice appraisals (O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011), why do observers fail to intervene? 
And why do we see collective mistreatment, such as mobbing, gossip, and social ostracism? 
From our perspective, it is not uncommon for observers to appraise mistreatment in a positive 
light and feel joy. Furthermore, when observers respond with schadenfreude, they may not only 
side with and accord higher status to the initial perpetrators of mistreatment who brought about 
this joy but also become coinstigators. Through this process, mistreatment becomes contagious 
and spawns collective action. Thus, our conceptual work points to the potential for observers to 
reinforce rather than reverse the dynamics of workplace mistreatment. 
Finally, in drawing attention to the role of binding and individualizing moral foundations 
(Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011), we challenge the view that moral elevation 
necessarily contains the proclivity to harm others (Mitchell et al., 2015). That is, although 
observers who hold individualizing moral values are less likely to inflict harm as a response to 
schadenfreude, observers who subscribe to binding moral values are more likely to express their 
pleasure and further mistreat victims when they feel righteous schadenfreude. 
Directions for Future Research 
Our conceptual work provides a starting point for research on observer schadenfreude, 
and we see the potential for further development of our model. First, the factors evoking primary 
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and secondary appraisal are representative rather than exhaustive. For instance, witnesses are 
likely to consider the warmth and competence of victims, judging those who are competent but 
lacking warmth (i.e., competent jerks) as most deserving of mistreatment (Casciaro & Lobo, 
2005, 2008). Also, the role of leaders merits further attention, because leaders provide 
particularly salient cues regarding appropriate behavior. The social learning perspective on 
aggression (Bandura, 1978) suggests that observers may perceive coworker mistreatment as 
more justified when leaders often display interpersonal injustice. 
Second, regarding boundary conditions for the effects of schadenfreude on behavior, we 
have considered both individualizing and binding moral foundations at the individual-level but 
have addressed civility climate as an undifferentiated construct at the group-level. Just as 
individuals may embrace individualizing and binding moral foundations, work environments 
may vary in their collective endorsement of these values. Thus, research should address the 
moderating effects of binding and individualizing values as both individual- and organization-
level moral foundations. 
Third, we acknowledge the importance of examining schadenfreude’s downstream 
consequences. For example, researchers should consider the adverse effects of suppressing the 
joy of ambivalent schadenfreude for observers’ well-being. Although observers may effectively 
align their emotional expressions with established display rules by suppression, their inner 
feelings still remain (Kalokerinos, Greenaway, & Denson, 2015). Thus, suppressing emotions 
can evoke distressful emotional dissonance and feelings of inauthenticity (Grandey, 2000; Gross 
& John, 2003). Future research should also address whether gossip in response to righteous 
schadenfreude has prosocial effects, such as enhancing ingroup solidarity or preventing future 
norm violations. 
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Implications for Practice 
As interpersonal mistreatment in organizations continues to increase (Porath & Pearson, 
2013), managers and employees need to realize that if schadenfreude becomes pervasive, 
mistreatment could become normative. Thus, we offer suggestions for managers to reduce 
schadenfreude and prevent negative spirals of mistreatment. 
Organizations should reduce structural, interpersonal, and intergroup tensions that cause 
initial schadenfreude. First, to counter the competition that generates schadenfreude, 
organizations should promote cooperation through shared visions and team-based incentives 
(Gomez-Mejia & Franco-Santos, 2015; Wong, Tjosvold, & Yu, 2005). Second, because envy is 
associated with schadenfreude, organizations should encourage practices that reduce envy. 
Managers should be aware that deservingness is a key determinant of emotional reactions to 
upward comparisons—that is, whereas undeserved advantages incur envy and resentment, 
deserved advantages elicit benign responses (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2012). Thus, 
procedural justice and distributive justice are essential for preventing high achievers from being 
targets of envy. Third, managers should promote inclusive climates to reduce intergroup tension 
(Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz, & Brewer, 1993; Nishii, 2013). 
Furthermore, managers should bear in mind that judgments of whether mistreatment is 
deserved are subject to attribution error, intergroup bias, and social influence. Therefore, we 
advise organizations to investigate incidents of mistreatment with a focus on establishing 
whether injustice was involved. For example, managers could provide observers with facts about 
transgressions and emphasize their inappropriateness to preempt the conclusion that a victim’s 
mistreatment is deserved. Moreover, since deservingness judgments are socially constructed and 
close observers may share perceptions, managers should pay close attention to the views of 
opinion leaders within social groups. Even when a victim has provoked mistreatment, managers 
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should avert spirals of mistreatment through prudent intervention and an emphasis on 
forgiveness (Fehr & Gelfand, 2012). 
Conclusion 
We extend theory and research on observer reactions to workplace mistreatment by 
addressing the emergence, development, and consequences of schadenfreude, an incongruent 
social emotion. As much as we might wish that people would respond to workplace mistreatment 
with empathy and care, we also recognize the importance of theorizing about human nature as it 
is. We hope our conceptual work motivates organizational scholars to give systematic attention 
to counternormative emotions such as schadenfreude. Even Immanuel Kant, a scholar better 
known for his discourses on deontic justice and individuals’ rights to just and caring treatment, 
embraced schadenfreude as appropriate in particular situations: 
If someone who likes to vex and disturb peace-loving people finally gets a sound 
thrashing for one of his provocations, this is certainly an ill, yet everyone would 
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